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369.

Telegram From the Ambassador in Brazil (Briggs) to the
Department of State'
Rio de Janeiro, November 7, 1957-7 p.m.

608. Notwithstanding brave words and comforting assurances
Brazil leaders, I believe citizens this country profoundly affected by
Russian scientific achievement 2 and that Brazil confidence in American technological supremacy has been temporarily impaired. Obviously first concern is re-establishment confidence in our abilities, but
within that urgent preoccupation following observations are submitted as germane to local scene:
1. Although President Kubitschek's declarations reported Embassy telegram 5933 envisage no change Brazil's policy, nevertheless in
light orbital astonishment some reassessment by Brazilians of this
country's position in free world versus Communist world struggle
seems inevitable. Combined strength proponents thereof should not
be underestimated. Furthermore Brazil public opinion confused
stream, fifty percent illiterate. It is tempting water for Communist
fishing.
2. Brazil must be primary Latin American Communist target
new campaign, triggered by belief spectacular scientific achievement
presents opportune moment, has already begun. Its immediate objectives are probably trade-plus-diplomatic relations, and legalizing
Communist party. But other attractive fields may include development Brazil's enormous resources: offer to loan Petrobras X million
dollars at nominal interest, with petroleum technicians attached, may
be imminent possibility. Iron resources may appear almost equally
tempting.
3. Kubitschek administration while well-meaning . . . lacks
broad basis popular support. Financial difficulties impend and can
multiply GOB's troubles. We can continue to shore up government,
(Continued)
"The President stated that the policy of the US with respect to Brazil had been a
wise one; that despite growing manifestations of extreme nationalism the US had not
altered its policy of economic assistance, and that his economic development program
which proceeding according to schedule would have been completely impossible
without such aid. I felt there was some implication in that he anticipates further
economic assistance in order maintain rhythm his program.
"Summing up present situation, Kubitschek reiterated fundamental policy continuing close collaboration with US, plus assurances mentioned reference telegram that
his government would neither reestablish relations with USSR nor legalize local CP."
(Aid.)
, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.32/11-757. Secret.
2Reference is to the successful launching by the Soviet Union on Oct. 4 of the
first man-made earth satellite into outer space, Sputnik I.
3 See footnote 3, supa.
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at not insignificant cost: we should probably continue to do so ...
Government's success in countering demands for "reassessment"
inevitably handicapped even though friendship and good intentions
of administration are believed genuine and based on leaders' conviction of self interest.
4. Our assumption that Latin America is a safe rear area might
well be re-examined. Brazil possesses gigantic potential but its safety
in baleful Sputnik afterglow is debatable matter. Brazil also enjoys
leadership value in hemisphere by reason of size, population and
relative freedom from parochial rivalries. I again suggest that within
framework of inter-American relations, Brazil should occupy special
position.
5. Brazil leaders are eager to be taken into our confidence, and
to share our plans. Personal message given Kubitschek November 5
from President Eisenhower had excellent effect. Whatever we do to
give Brazilians sense of greater participation pays dividends. Last
year Brazil wanted send observer to NATO. We rejected proposal,
fearing it might lead to 20 neighborhood kibitzers cluttering up
premises. Now however, consonant with Secretary's "we do not
stand alone" estimate, might it not be desirable invite OAS (rather
than separate members) to send observer to NATO?
Following that meeting, visit to Rio and perhaps other principal
hemisphere capitals by Secretary would seem desirable, especially
since Latin Americans remember last visit terminated because of
Suez crisis.
After same meeting Spaak4 or some other non-American spokesman of prominence might profitably tour good neighborhood, seeking to interpret free Europe to Latin America (and incidentally
soothe new world apprehensions over Common Market).
Canada's position vis-i-vis OAS might likewise be re-examined
with view to making greater use of Canada as hemisphere partner.
7. Foregoing and other moves and suggestions will doubtless
occur to Department. Purpose this message is to warn that recent
assurances, sincere though I regard them to be, give scant ground for
complacency in post-satellite Brazilian situation.
Briggs
4

Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO.

